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THE USE AND ABUSE OF PRESUMPTIONS:
SOME COMMENTS ON DEMPSEY ON FINNIS
MATTHEW LISTER*

I

N the short space available to me I want to do two things; first, to offer a
brief defense of one aspect of John Finnis’s account of law that is criticized by Michelle Dempsey in her contribution, and second, to see if I
might re-cast the objection in such a way that it might yet pose a worry for
Finnis’s account. I am not certain that even the re-cast objection does
pose a worry for Finnis’s views, as deciding this issue that would require
some empirical knowledge that I do not have, and that is perhaps not
easily available. But, I do think the re-cast objection is one that ought to
make us hesitate from adopting Finnis’s account whole-heartedly.
In her paper, Dempsey expresses concern about Finnis’s claim that
valid laws create a presumptive obligation to obey. The concern comes in
two forms. The first, which she attributes to various legal positivists,1 is
that people might feel obliged to obey certain non-laws which they mistakenly take to be laws, because they think there is an obligation to obey law
generally. This objection seems somewhat obscure to me. Even if we follow Hart in thinking that we are more likely to encourage people to oppose unjust laws by pointing out that legality need not imply morality than
we would be by claiming that an unjust law is no law,2 it is not clear to me
why this would justify a heavy focus on the conditions of legality as a means
to avoid a feeling of obligation to obey unjust law. If avoiding allegiance
to morally repugnant law is our goal, it is not clear to me why we would
not be better off directly arguing that an unjust law imposes no moral
obligation, without the detour through questions about conditions of legality. This may well be a view held by certain positivists, but if so, it seems
confused, or at least unnecessarily circuitous, to me, so I shall leave it aside
from here.
The more interesting way that the concern comes up is in relation to
what Dempsey calls a “critical” perspective on the law. This is one that
turns a skeptical and critical eye towards the law, and looks for ways that it
may be oppressive and harmful. Dempsey’s concern seems to be that, if
* Visiting Assistant Professor, Villanova University School of Law. J.D.,
University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2006, Ph.D., University of Pennsylvania
Department of Philosophy, 2009. My thanks to Michelle Dempsey for useful
comments and to the students in my Spring 2012 Jurisprudence course at
Villanova for helping me think about the idea of law being for the common good.
1. In particular, Dempsey attributes this view to Hart. See H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 210 (2nd ed. 1997). By implication, the view seems to be attributed to John Gardner and Joseph Raz as well. This implication seems plausible to
me.
2. Id.
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we follow Finnis in thinking that valid laws (where we take that to mean
laws that have the proper pedigree in the relevant legal system) create a
presumptive obligation to obey, then we will tend not to take up a healthy
skeptical and critical view, and if we fail to take up this critical view, we will
miss many ways that law in general, a legal system, or particular laws (the
three should be kept separate) can be oppressive or harmful.
I am in favor of keeping a skeptical and critical eye on the law, and for
challenging laws that are oppressive and harmful. This is a virtue that we
ought to inculcate in our law students, in particular, it seems to me. And,
I am modestly confident that, at least in many circumstances, there is no
moral obligation to obey such laws, if they are harmful or oppressive
enough. There might be some exceptions to this, mostly related to collateral or systemic effects, but we may leave them aside for now. But, it is not
clear to me why Finnis cannot agree with this, and accept the need for a
critical perspective in this sense. After all, on his account, valid laws provide only a presumptive obligation to obey, and it is the nature of presumptions that they can be over-come. It seems perfectly reasonable to
me that one place the presumption could be over-come is in the case of
laws (or perhaps whole legal systems, though this is a harder case) that are
oppressive or harmful to the human good. I am not sure what it would
mean to say that the obligation to obey is a “presumptive” one unless it
could be over-come, and this seems to me to be a clear case where the
presumption might be over-come, if the oppression or harm engendered
by a law or legal system were serious enough. If that is right, then I am not
sure that the “critical” view needs to be seen as a distinct alternative to
Finnis’s view. It is even plausible, I think, that such a critical perspective
might be a necessary part of Finnis’s view, if the “presumptive” aspect of
the obligation to obey is to have any force.
This does not mean, however, that we should be entirely happy to
stop here. Presumptions like this are dangerous tools, in that they can
easily make a theory vapid. If any case where it looks like laws or a legal
system should not be binding on us can be dealt with by noting that the
obligation is only a “presumptive” one, then it is hard to know what could
count against the theory. But if the theory is thereby insulated from
counter-examples, we should have doubts as to why it is something we
should care about.3

3. One possible approach here would be to claim that this is a definitional
matter. This is a possible reply, but an unsatisfactory one, for two reasons. First, if
we are satisfied with this reply as such, it is not clear why it cannot be invoked by
competing accounts of law, too. Second, and more importantly, if we want our
definition to be of any use, it must correspond, at least much of the time, to our
practices. We may, of course, maintain a definition that has the result of making
in the case that law exists much less often than we think it does, but this seems like
an implausible approach, both philosophically and sociologically.
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Here I think we should go back to a central element of Finnis’s account, the idea that law is directed towards “the common good.”4 If this is
to be interesting, it cannot just be an analytical claim about the word
“law”. But many people have rejected this claim, and it does not seem to
me to be a self-evident or obvious truth. Marxists and anarchists, for example, have held that law is merely a means for those in power to dominate the majority, and hold that the claim that law is directed towards the
common good is a sham.5 The very idea that law is directed towards the
common good, on this account, helps law achieve its real aim, that of benefiting a privileged few. My own thought is that Finnis’s account is closer
to right than that of the Marxist or anarchist, though there is much to
consider and worry about in their views, too.
But, it seems to me, to decide between the two stories, we need to be
able to look at law (and perhaps legal systems) from the outside, with
something like a sociological perspective. I think that legal positivism can
play an important role in developing that perspective, and so is a valuable
research program, though one engaged in an importantly different project than is Finnis. For example, while Hart has been criticized for characterizing his project as “descriptive sociology”,6 there seems to me to be
more that is right in that remark than is usually thought. This sort of
critical perspective on the law is one that cannot just be answered by the
use of the presumptive nature of our duty to obey the law, as we need this
perspective to decide whether the presumption has validity or not, and if it
threatens to make the theory vapid or not. When we see the need for this
perspective on law, we can see the importance and force of Finnis’s view
without worrying that it will lead us to accept oppressive laws, or without it
turning out to be vapid.
4. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 276 (1980). For very useful discussion of this idea, see MARK C. MURPHY, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: THE FUNDAMENTALS 11–13, 81–83 (2006).
5. For useful discussion of this claim in relation to Marxism, see JONATHAN
WOLFF, WHY READ MARX TODAY? 56–66 (2003), and Louis Althusser, Ideology and
Ideological State Apparatuses, in LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 127, 137
(1971). See also MURPHY, supra note 4, at 195–98, for a useful, if skeptical, discussion of this sort of critique.
6. HART, supra note 1, at vi. For a mild version of this criticism, see Stephen
R. Perry, Hart’s Methodological Positivism, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW 311, 314–15 (Jules Coleman, ed. 2001). I agree
with most of Perry’s account in this article, but also think there is much to gain by
taking Hart at his word as to his approach.
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